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The words  "political  economy"  describe  the  meshing  of political
authority  with  the  economic  system.  There  has  always  been  a
substantial  interplay  between  public  authority  and so-called  private
economic  activity.  What  that  relationship  ought  to  be  makes  for
lively  discussion.  Governments  tax,  enact  tariffs,  subsidize  canals
just  as  they  did  in  George  Washington's  day.
Throughout  the  19th  century,  the  U.S.  economy  was  capitalist,
and  the  government  was  only  slightly  involved  in  directing  the
nation's  economic  development.  Events  changed  the  economy,  and
in  response,  the  voting  public  and  political  leaders  changed  the
degree  of  involvement  of  government.  The  industrialization  and
urbanization  of  our  agricultural  economy  produced  waves  of
political  reform  in  the  pre-World  War  I  era.  Even  more  occurred
during  the  Great  Depression  of the  1930s.  On  the  eve  of  World
War  II,  the  American  political  economy  was  characterized  by
extensive  involvement  of  national  policy  with  economic  life.  The
involvement  was  greater  than  at  any  previous  time.
This  new  system  did  not please  everyone,  and  the  years  of  its
construction,  especially  the  first  two  administrations  of  President
Franklin  D.  Roosevelt,  were  a time  of intense  controversy.  Despite
complaints  about  its radical  novelty,  it  was  endorsed  by  the  voters
with  massive  electoral  majorities  in  1936,  1940,  1944,  and 1948.
By the  1950s  it was  readily apparent that nothing  could  be  done
to reverse  the trend.  The political  economy  of the  1930s  was  deeply
entrenched  and  accepted  by  the  majority.  If  you  did  not  like  the
system  you  called  it  Big  Government,  Leviathan,  Big  Brother,  or
even  Socialism.  But  these  were  not  accurate  or  effective  labels.
Friends  of the  system called  it  New  Deal  liberalism  and  the welfare
state.  They  were  mistaken,  because  the  system  was  less  concerned
with  welfare  or  care  of the  poor  and  indigent,  than  regulation  of
the  economy.  The  purpose  was  to  maximize  output  consistent  with
stability.
THE BROKER  STATE
The  sustained  national  emergency  which  began  in  1941  subtly
altered  the  New  Deal  system.  Defense  expenditures  were  increased
1at the  expense  of domestic  programs.  The  presidency  later became
even  more exalted,  self-important,  and  imperial than  in  FDR's  day.
These  changes,  while  they  made  a  difference,  did  not  funda-
mentally  alter  the  post-New  Deal  political  economy.  That  system
probably  should  have  been  called  the  "Broker  State".  For  as  rela-
tively  large  and  busy as  was  the government  in regulating,  subsidiz-
ing,  taxing,  and  spending,  its  outstanding  characteristic  was  its
lack  of a  guiding purpose.  It had  neither  vision  nor  plan.
Public  policy  had  no  socialist  utopia  in  mind.  It  accepted
comfortably  a  predominantly  capitalist,  market  economy.  It  had
few  explicit  goals  beyond  the  promotion  of  a  mix  of  economic
growth  with  price  stability which  the  public  expected.  The  Broker
State  had  few  central  institutions  defining  its  purposes  or  develop-
ing  its  guiding  strategies.  It  was  a  broker,  sure  only  of  its  vague
and  general  mandate  to  avoid  depression  and  promote  economic
growth.  It  took  the  rest  of  its  assignments  from  the  clamoring
voices  of organized  pressure  groups.  Government  became  a  large
but uncoordinated  collection  of agencies.  These  agencies  intervened
everywhere-setting  the  price  of  butter,  conducting  scientific  re-
search,  subsidizing  the  building  of  private  merchant  ships,  giving
tax  advantages  to  oil  companies,  mailing  checks  to  the  blind  and
the  retired,  determining  where  air  carriers  could  operate  and  at
what rates,  delivering the mail  and  supplying  a  huge  defense  estab-
lishment.
All  of this  activity  was  not  coordinated  from  the  center  in  any
significant  way.  Actually,  the  center  was  remarkably  weak  as  an
institution  for  social  management.  The  chief executive  had  a  small
personal  staff in  1939.  In  1946,  the  president  first  gained  a three-
man council of economic  advisers.  In  the  1950s  the  president  could
call  on  only  one  scientific  adviser.  He  could,  however,  form  task
forces  and  commissions  to  study  vexing  public  issues.  He  could
convene  his  cabinet,  but without  staff or  complete  loyalty  to  presi-
dential  purposes,  little could  be accomplished  in  the  way  of chart-
ing  policy directions.
The  congressional  branch  was  pathetically  underequipped  for
coherent  policymaking.  It  could  scarcely  cope  with  rapid  change  or
technological  advances,  but  faced  events  as  they  reached  crisis
proportions.  Harry Truman appointed  a  presidential  commission  to
study raw  material  procurement,  the  only  one  of its  kind  in Ameri-
can history  to  that time.  The  Paley  Commission  projected  supplies
and  demand  until  1975.  But no  one  paid  much  attention.  Taxing,
spending,  subsidizing,  and  regulating  were  directed  in  compart-
ments  on  a  day  to  day  basis.  The  budget  process,  with  its  short
2one-year  vision,  was  the  only  connecting  link  serving  to  coordinate
federal  activities.  Through the  1940s  and  1950s and  into  the  1960s,
Americans  struggled mainly with  the  Soviet  Union,  or at  least  were
aware  of the ebb  and flow of Russian  hostility.  Everything  else  took
care  of  itself within  the  loose  system  of  a  mixed  economy  and  a
broker  government.
My words  perhaps  betray  some  disrespect.  But  if that  tone  is
appropriate,  it  is  only  so  in  retrospect.  It  would  not  have  been
understood  by  the  hard-working  and  well-meaning  citizens  who
managed  or  observed  the  post-New  Deal  political  economy.  For  it
worked!  Not  only  were  essential  liberties  maintained,  not  only  was
Communist  expansion  reasonably  contained  without  war,  but  the
economy  did  well  under  our  governing  arrangements.  And  what,
after  all,  is  a  more  important  test  of any  system than  the  capacity
to  achieve  affluence  for  many  and  basic  survival  for  all?  The
American  economy  shifted  from  war  to  peaceful  production  in  the
1940s,  avoided  the  predicted  post-war  depression,  then  set  a  course
of rising  production  of goods  and  services  every  year  through  the
1950s.  It had  been  interrupted  by only two  recessions,  and  without
serious  inflation.  It dominated  the  world  economy  with  American
currency,  goods,  techniques,  and  slogans.  Business  thrived,  labor
joined  the  partnership  and  enjoyed  rising  incomes  and  consumer
goods.  Agriculture  became  productive and  prosperous,  feeding  both
America  and  many  foreigners  with  a  shrinking  farm  labor  force.
The  old curse  of tenancy  virtually  disappeared.  Communists  abroad
challenged  our  political  economy  both  in  principle  and  in
performance,  but  they  could  not  begin  to  match  its  bounty  and
their  predictions  did  not  produce  the  anticipated  massive  collapse
of American  capitalism.
Defenders  of  the  American  system  pointed  not  only  to  the
economic  record,  but  to  the  accessibility  to  private  groups  and
individuals  of  the  government's  decision-makers.  The  government
regulated  and aided  society in  a willy-nilly but well-intentioned  way.
The  vigorous  capitalist  economy  seemed  to  thrive  on  this
arrangement,  even  if some  individuals  were  perpetually  disgruntled
at the  persistence  of a suspicious  smelling  lubricant  for the  engines
of prosperity-annual  federal  deficits.  But to  most this  was  a  small
price  to  pay.  The  benefit  was  economic  growth  that  brought
affluence  to  every  class  of  Americans,  steadily  diminishing  the
acute  poverty  of the  1930s.  It was  growth  earned  by  skilled  hands
and  minds,  wrung  out of America's  apparently  unlimited  resources
of minerals,  forests,  water,  and  fertile  soils.  No  national  election
from  1932  all the way into the  1970s  was  to reveal  a  majority  of the
3electorate  as  being  eager  for basic  change.
FUNDAMENTAL  DOUBTS
Yet  sometime  in the  late  1960s  or  the  early  1970s  we  began  to
entertain  fundamental  doubts  about  our  political  economy.  I  refer
here  to  difficult  and  growing  social  problems  that  prodded  the
media  into using the  words  "crisis"  with  increasing  frequency.  We
have  had  an  unbroken  series  of  crises  since  at  least  the  British
collapse  in  Greece  in  1947.  A  crisis  in  Eisenhower's  or  Kennedy's
or  even  Johnson's  day,  was  simply  a  time  for  all  of  us  to  work
harder  or  do  better.  Or  we  could  get  new  leaders.  Into  the  late
1960s,  with  five  years  of  urban  riots  behind  us  and  the  social
divisions  of the  Vietnam war,  it was still  possible  to believe  that  the
Communists  were  our  main  threat.  We  still  felt  that  our  own
system  of governance-not  necessarily  the  existing  leadership,  but
certainly  the  system-was  adequate  to manage  our affairs.
This basic  confidence  has seriously  eroded  in  the  last  decade.  If
you  ask the  average  citizen  what  are the  most serious  internal  mal-
functions  affecting  American  public  life,  he  probably  begins  with
the code  word  Watergate.  The  word  refers  to  a  series  of abuses  of
power  in the  executive  branch  of government-White  House,  FBI,
CIA-that continued  under both  parties  and culminated  in  a  bitter
constitutional  crisis  in  1974.  Watergate  has  largely  opened  to  our
view  a  profound  malaise  in  the  functioning  of  our  government.
Congress  is  not  immune.  The  visible  results  are  apathy,  citizen
alienation,  a sour  anti-government  mood,  and  slumping voter  turn-
out.
But  of course  our  crisis  involves  more than  the  political  system.
If  one  assignment  of  our  governing  institutions  is  to  preserve
liberties,  another  is  to  manage  the  domestic  and  foreign  means  of
survival  and  the  satisfaction  of  our  wants.  Economists  who  have
served  in  the government  tell  us that this  has  been  done  rather  well
since  the  Employment  Act  of  1946.
But  the  situation  has  recently,  and  quickly,  become  more
complicated  and  the  prospects  more  ominous.  A  new  economic
characteristic  is  the  anomaly  of both  high  inflation  and high  unem-
ployment.  This painful  new  malady does  not seem to respond  to the
old  Keynesian,  macroeconomic  remedies.  Alert  people  know  that
something  serious  is  amiss,  perhaps  out of control.
4Then  in  1972-73  came  a great  season  of shortages.  This  will  be
seen  as  a  decided  turning  point  in  both  the  performance  of  the
American  political  economy  and  public  attitudes  toward  it.  We
received  a  cold  bath  in fundamentals.  Resources  were  limited,  and
the human  populations  hoping to consume  them  were  expanding  at
stunning  rates.  Bread,  that  overlooked  fundamental  of  life,  was
something  that  the  Soviets  wanted,  and  an  inexplicable  govern-
mental  blunder helped  send  it  into shortage.  An Arab  cartel  raised
the  price  of  oil  by  100%  at  one  stroke.  Energy,  we  learned,  was
fundamental  and  in  shortage.  The  Club  of Rome  published  THE
LIMITS  TO  GROWTH,  predicting  a  mounting  series  of shortages
and disorders  as  populations  outran  resources.  The human  popula-
tion passed  four billion in the spring of 1976,  and a  United  Nations
study  predicted  a  total  of  12  billion  in  50  years.  Agricultural
resources  diminished,  then disappeared.  It was  not the granary  that
was  ever  normal,  but  hungry  people  pressing  against  diminishing
resources.
MANAGEMENT  AND  INTERDEPENDENCE
Because  we  were  too complacent  before,  some writers  have  over-
estimated  our problems  and underestimated  our assets.  Still,  I  have
no  hesitation  in  predicting  that someday  school  children  will  refer
to our era  as pivotal,  the  End of the Growth Era and the  coming  of
the  Era  of Management  and  Interdependence.
Let  us  begin  with  the  matter  of  growth.  Reflect  on  what  shifts
in  values  and  attitudes  are  required  of  us  and  our  children.  We
must  make the break  with  four  centuries  of Yankee  reliance  upon
unlimited  abundance.  We  must  absorb  the  revolutionary  but
irresistable  truths  that  resources  are  finite.  Man  must  achieve
equilibrium  with  the  planetary  space  he  inhabits.  If  we  redefine
growth  to  mean  the  enlargement  of  human  choices,  perhaps  we
may yet  pursue  it  to the  end  of time.  If we  do  not  redefine  it,  we
will just  have  to  part with  it.
Think  of what  that means!  A  whole  new  system  of accounting!
Small  is  beautiful,  Rhode  Island  a  better  place  than  Texas,  little
people  favored  over  big,  except  for  NFL  recruiting;  small  towns
favored  over  large  ones,  the managers  of garbage  as  honored  as the
captains  of industry,  the  engineering  of equilibrium  raised  up  and
the  gods  of consumption  nudged  down.
We  have  always  hated  waste,  honored  the  soil,  and  respected
nature-some  of  us  part  of the  time.  Our  cultural  realignment  of
values  may  not  go  so  slowly  as  we  might  think.  But  we  are
interested  here  in the  implications  of the  necessity  for  a  degree  of
5social  management  undreamed  of,  as  a  swarming  population
presses  upon  the  shrinking  margins  of environmental  safety.
Reflect  on  the  second  identifying  idea  of  our  season  of  crisis
-interdependence.  Another  way  to  state  this  is,  vulnerability.  We
have  been  learning  the  lesson  of  interdependence  for  years-
attended  elementary  school  with  the  first  world  war,  high  school
with  the  war  against  fascism  in  the  1940s.  We  reached  a  higher
level  of  understanding  when  the  atomic  bomb  brought  the  entire
planet  within  reach  of  a  common  destruction.  Yet  these  inter-
dependences  were  products  of war.  We  have  not  yet  fully  realized
how  daily  we  are  linked  in  a  common  life  to  what  Adlai  Stevenson
years  ago  called  Spaceship  Earth.
Technology  has  been  at work,  especially  electronic  communica-
tion.  The  world  of  business  has  been  aggressively  exploring  the
shrinking  barriers  to  interchange,  aided  now  by  the  multinational
corporation  which  transcends  national  lines  and  loyalties.  The  sea
is  an  endangered  common  resource;  so  is  the  atmosphere.  When
Brazilians  cut  away  rain  forests,  drought  and  famine  come  to
Africa,  and  the  Canadian  growing  season  is  shortened.  Concordes
and  aerosol  cans  are  said  to  reduce  the  ozone  layer,  not  just  over
France  and  the  U.  S.  but  over  the  natives  of Ethiopia  and  Japan.
Life everywhere  is affected  when  agricultural  methods  change,  when
the  flow  of  rivers  is  reversed,  and  when  over  population  breeds
famine  and  unrest.  These  linkages  make  us  all  vulnerable  to  other
nation's  activities,  whether  benign  or  careless.  Our  vast  intercon-
nected  global  economy  is  increasingly  productive.  It  is  also  fragile.
We  are  exposed,  and  permanently  so,  to  the  malfunction  of some
part,  a  sudden  imbalance  of relationships  in the  world  system.
How  does  American  society,  as  well  as  planetary  society,  cope
with  crowding,  with  relentless  scientific  and  technology  innovation,
and  with  a  tidal  wave  of  change,  much  of  which  will  be
destabilizing?  It must and  will  search  for the  means  of anticipating
the  future before  it  arrives  and destabilizes.  It must  analyze  chang-
ing  conditions  in  the  basic  environment,  devise  effective  and
comprehensive  policy  correctives  to  maximize  social  goals,  bring
population  growth  under control and manage  it to equilibrium,  and
bring  an  end  to  environmental  pollution.  Can  we  do  these  things
with  the  present  system  of governmental  management,  the  present
attitudes  toward  social  management?
6VIEWS  OF  AMERICA'S  FUTURE
There  are  three  broad  schools  of  prophecy,  or  persuasion,
among  those  who  think  about  the  future  of the  American  system.
Some  remain  convinced  that incremental  change  within the current
framework  will  suffice,  or  will  be  all  that the  political  system  and
national  leadership  will  accept.  This  view  has  the  advantage  of
appearing  to  be  calm,  and  therefore  perhaps  also  wise.  It  gains
plausibility  when  we  recall  that  many  political,  economic,  and
politoco-economic  revolutions  have  been  predicted  for  America,  yet
have  not occurred.  Nonetheless,  this view  is mistaken.  We  will have
sharp departures,  and systematic  change.
A  second  persuasion,  convinced  of  the  malfunctioning  of
contemporary  American  governmental  institutions  and  assump-
tions,  predicts  that  the  political  economy  must  and  will  change
radically.  This  opinion  has  been  around  for  40 years  and  more.  In
this  view our  problems  prove  that  we  have  too  much  political  and
too  little  economy.  The  government  mismanages  everything  it
touches  except  national  defense  and  internal  security,  which  ought
to be  pursued  even  more  vigorously.  Politicans  and  hired  bureau-
crats  have  always  mismanaged  the  economy.  They  have  produced
the shortages that shocked  an affluent  people,  failed to  end  poverty
with  massive  Great  Society  programs,  and  made  the  race  problem
worse  by  remedial  laws  and  promises  which  merely  raised  expecta-
tions.  They have endlessly  interfered with the marketplace  which,  if
left  alone,  would  automatically  select  the  right  economic  decisions
for this  society.
The  instinct  of  people  of  this  persuasion-mislabeled  "Con-
servative"-was  to  seek  radical  reduction  of  governmental  func-
tions.  There  was  a  lot  of talk  of  this  sort  in  the  Nixon  admin-
istration,  and  also in the  more  recent  Ford government.  Mr.  Nixon
promised  us  "a  new  American  revolution"  if congress  would  just
pass  his  revenue  sharing  proposals.  There  has  not  been  much
movement,  however,  toward  a  pre-New  Deal  political  economy.
The  reasons  include  not  only  that  the  people  who  talked  that
way  have  been  unwilling  to  risk  moving  toward  a  weaker
managment  role  for the  national  government  (and  indeed  may  not
even  have  cared  very  much  personally  one  way  or  the  other),  but
also  that  they  were  outnumbered,  outargued,  and  invariably  out-
voted.
Could  a few more  months  or years  of our current  forest of social
problems  bring  the  public  to  demand  a  radical  revision  of  our
system?  I  think  not.  This  school  sees  clearly  the  defects  of  the
current  system,  but they  point  in a  direction that we  are  not  going
to travel.
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prophecy.  We  are  moving  toward  a new  political  economy,  and  we
will  have  to call it  planning.  To  substantiate that prediction,  and  to
define  the  idea  of national  planning,  we  have  to  go  back  some  40
years.  During the Great Depression  of the  1930s,  national  planning
was  one  of  the  large  organizing  social  strategies  that  jostled  for
influence  in the  emergency  atmosphere  of that  time.  This  was  not
because  anybody  really  knew what  planning  was  or  exactly  how  to
do  it  on  a  national  scale  (the  Soviet  experience  with  planning  was
known  to be  interesting,  but hardly  applicable  to  American  condi-
tions),  but because  one  crisis  brought to  mind  another.  Americans
had turned  to  planning  during the  brief but  effective  mobilization
of World  War  I.
By  coincidence,  the  new  president  in  1933,  Franklin  Roosevelt,
was  a  planner  by  instinct  and  conviction.  He  and  his  planning-
oriented  Brain  Trust formulated  the  basic  planning  assumptions  in
the  early years of a crippling  depression.  It  was  that  modern  indus-
trial  society  requires  public  intervention  to  attain  stable  growth,
that  such  intervention  must  touch  all  fundamental  social  develop-
ments,  that  it must be  goal-oriented  and  effectively  coordinated  at
the  center,  and  anticipatory  rather than  reactive.
The New  Dealers never  worked  out satisfactory forms  to embody
these  ideas,  and  congress  resisted  every  advance  in that  direction.
By  the  end  of the  1930s  Roosevelt  had  been  forced  to  give  up  on
national  planning and to  accept  the uncoordinated  system  of short-
range  interventions  that has  lasted  to this  day.
So the  national  planning  impulse  of the  early  New  Deal  was  not
only  frustrated,  it  was  forgotten.  Yet  Roosevelt's  planning  experi-
ments  produced  much  clarification,  at  least  in  retrospect.  John
Dewey  warned  in 1939 against a planned,  as  opposed  to  a planning
society,  stressing  the  open,  tentative,  experimental,  and  democratic
qualities  appropriate  to  planning.  A  planning  society  would  be
characterized  by  two  main  features  at  the  governmental  level  that
FDR  did  not  find  when  he  came  to  Washington.  First,  effective
policy  contact  with  the  major  sources  of  social  change.  Second,  a
set of planning  capacities  at the  center  of government,  meshed  into
a planning  process.
As to the first,  it is  well known  that the  New  Deal  expanded  the
government's  influence  over  the  economy.  In  traditional  areas  of
governmental  activity,  such  as  transportation,  communication,
energy,  natural  resource  management,  FDR  tried  to  synthesize
existing  policies  into national  policy.  And there  were new  areas  that
8needed  to  be entered.  For the  first time,  excepting  perhaps  briefly
during  World  War  I,  the  government  developed  what  is  today
called  an  Incomes  Policy,  involving  itself in  wage  and  price  deci-
sions.  Through  the  Reconstruction  Finance  Corporation  (and  to  a
lesser  extent  through  its  housing  and  agricultural  credit  policies),
the  New  Deal  exercised  strong  influence  over  private  investment.
These  policy  tools,  along  with  the  traditional  fiscal,  monetary
and  regulatory  instruments,  did  not  add  up  to  planning  in  them-
selves.  They  were  not  intended  to  do  so  by  the  congressmen  who
voted  for  them  piecemeal.  But  they  constituted  the  full  armory  of
economic  policies  required  to manage  a  modern  economy.
The  New  Dealers  took  on  this  assignment  of  social  manage-
ment  with  a  zest  that  set  them  apart  from  their  predecessors.  It
was  soon  obvious  that  more  was  involved  than  merely  "the
economy"  in the  narrow sense.  Before the  1930s  were  over,  the  New
Deal  had  made  important  efforts  to  extend  social  policy  to  touch
population  distribution  (now  called  national  growth  policy),  land
use,  and  science  and  technology.  Planned  social  development
required that  the  strategic points  of contact between  policy  and
society be subjected to  collective influence.  Roosevelt  and  his  gen-
eration  seemed  to  have located  most  of these.  Only  population  size
did  not  occur  to  them  as  an  important  agenda  item;  everybody
thought  the  population  was  shifting  toward  stability  or  even
decline.
All of the  above  was  aspiration,  and  only that.  The  government
in  the  1930s  never  fashioned  comprehensive  policy  in  all  of  these
areas.  The planners were  not up to the task  they  wished to  assume,
and  even  if they  had  been,  the  political  environment  was  hostile.
Efforts  to enter  new  fields  such  as land-use  or  population  distribu-
tion  were  substantially  defeated.  But  the  strategic  points  where
public  policy  must  be engaged  were  identified.
A second  prerequisite  in a planning  society  is  a  set of capacities
institutionalized  and  meshed  as  a  process  at  the  center  of govern-
ment  (and  then  effectively  regionalized  and  decentralized).  These
were  not  available  to  Roosevelt  when  he  came  to  Washington  in
1933.  The  first  Sunday  of his  presidency  he  wheeled  himself  into
the  Oval  office,  rang  a  bell,  and  no  one  answered!  Had  he  lined
them  all  up,  his  personal  staff  would  have  amounted  to  a  cook,
butler,  handful  of secretaries,  two  male  aides,  and  a  Navy  doctor.
The  president  had  in  his  direct  service  no  economists,  scientists,
statisticians,  lawyers,  philosophers,  nor  futurologists.
9Through  the  1930s,  FDR tried  to  remedy  the  chief  executive's
weaknesses  by  strengthening-or  initiating-the  capacity  for  eco-
nomic  and  social  accounting,  forecasting  of  future  trends,
technology  assessment,  and federal  policy coordination.  All  of these
capacities  he  tried  to  achieve  through  that  interesting  and  ill-fated
institution,  the  National  Resources  Planning  Board  (NRPB).  The
board  spent  up to  $1  million  a year  on  studies  of future  trends,  the
analysis  of social  as  well  as  economic  data,  and  the  setting  up  of
state  planning  agencies.  NRPB  was  greatly  interested  in  natural
resources  and  had  a  special  affection  for  long-range  thinking.  It
also  made  a futile  attempt,  at  the  president's  bidding,  to  do  what
the  cabinet  clearly  could  not  do,  coordinate  administration  policy.
The  board  was  abolished  by the  congress  in  1943.
A  final  but  important  institutional  barrier  to  plan,  rather
than  crisis-oriented  government,  was  the  reorganization  of  the
executive  branch which  FDR  sought  with  the  help  of the  Brownlow
committee  of  1936-1937.  Here,  too,  he  was  defeated.  So,  planning
was  tried  a  little bit  in  America  in the  1930s,  and  also through  the
ill-fated  National  Recovery  Administration,  but it  did  not take.
True,  the  onset  of  World  War  II  required  four  years  of  rela-
tively  comprehensive  planning.  But  this  interlude  was  seen  as
unique,  and  the  planning  apparatus  was  dismantled  in  1945-46
without  leaving  much  institutional  trace.  From  the  end  of the  war
until the  1960s  we  did not  talk about  national  planning  anymore  in
this  country,  except  to  condemn  it  as  a  mistake  that  Communists
and  sometimes  Socialists  made  in the  far  reaches  of Europe.
THE  NECESSITY  FOR  PLANNING
By  now you  may  have  anticipated  the  argument.  As  the  current
political  economy  has  developed  its  flaws  and faltered,  the  alterna-
tive that  comes  forward  more  irresistibly  has  American  origins  but
few  call  its  name  in  friendship-planning.  There  has  been  no
general  announcement  of  its  revival,  not  because  there  is  a  con-
spiracy  of  silence,  but  because  the  idea  of  planning  has  been  so
deeply  buried  that  busy  people  who  groped  for  institutional  solu-
tions to  governmental  problems  did  not  see  the  direction  in  which
they  moved.
I  spoke  earlier  of one  element  in  planning  a  political  economy,
that  is,  comprehensive  national  policy  at  all  strategic  points  of
social change.  The  recent drive  for  coherent  energy,  transportation,
food  and  fiber,  health,  and  other  substantive  policies  are  not  yet
successful  thrusts,  but rather  signs  in the  wind.  Areas  forbidden  to
the  New  Dealers  have  now  been  entered  by the  national  (and  often
10lower  levels  of)  government.  Population  distribution  became  a  vital
interest  of congress  when  it  passed  Title  VII  of  the  Housing  and
Community  Development  Act  of 1970  (and  the  Rural  Development
of 1972)  requiring  the president  to  help  develop  a  national  growth
policy  by  producing  a  biennial  national  growth  report.  National
land  use  planning  has  been  on  the  legislative  agenda  since  1970,
has  passed  the  senate  twice,  and  is  very  much  alive  as  a  policy
issue.  Without  a  national  land-use  planning  law,  we  have  edged
into  national  land-use  planning  through  environmental  controls
begun  in  1969,  such  as  flood  plain  insurance  legislation  and  the
1972  Coastal  Zone  Management  Act.  Since  1969,  with  the  National
Environmental  Protection  Act,  we  have  seen  a  quantum  jump  in
political  involvement  in resources  use  and environmental  protection.
Even  population  size  has  been  squarely  placed  on  the  national
agenda.  President  Nixon's  population  commission  went  so  far  as to
call  for  population  stabilization  as  a  national  goal,  and  a  joint
resolution  to that effect  was  introduced  in  1971.  It  is  only  a  matter
of time.  I  need  not mention  the  emergence  of an  Incomes Policy,  as
represented  by  Kennedy's  guidelines,  or  Nixon's  1971-74  controls.
The  move toward  a planning system  is  now  less than a matter  of
enlarging  governmental  contact  with  all  strategic  points  of  social
change  as rapid  evolution  toward  planning  capacities  at  the  center.
In  1971,  President  Nixon  established  the  Domestic  Council  for
horizontal  policy  coordination,  forecasting,  and  social  accounting.
He  had  shown  strong  interest  in  these  capacities  in  the  establish-
ment of the short-lived  National  Goals  Research  Staff in  1970.  The
executive  order  setting  up  the  Domestic  Council  reads  very  much
like  FDR's  words  in  launching  the  NRPB,  even  if  the  Domestic
Council  did  not  evolve  into  a  central  coordinating  institution  as
Nixon  intended.  Johnson  and  Nixon,  especially  the  latter,  worked
for  functional  reorganization  of the  executive  branch.  A  national
commission  on  supplies  and  shortages  is  now  at  work,  following
Nixon's  materials  policy  commission.  Congress  has  provided  itself
with  an  office  for  technology  assessment.  It  also  has  a  new  budget
procedure  with  staff  support  for  policy  review  and  long-range
budgetary  projections.  Since  1967 there  has  been  legislation  in  the
senate  hopper  for social  accounting.
Franklin  Roosevelt  would  see  a  pattern  in  all  of this.  Points  of
policy  leverage  upon  social  development  are  being  re-examined  in
the  hope that  federal  policy might  be  made  more  coherent,  antici-
patory,  informed  by  adequate  data,  and  disciplined  by  explicit
national  goals.  New  policy  areas,  especially  population  distribution
11and  land-use,  are  being  reconnoitered  prior  to  the  design  of
appropriate  national  policy.
Is  this  planning?  Not  yet.  It  is  only  a  resumption  of  the
movement toward  planning started  in the  1930s.  We  are  in another
planning  era, this time without the  institutional,  political  and  intel-
lectual  obstacles  that defeated  planning  in the  1930s.
Planning,  while  not  equally  popular  in  both  parties,  was
legitimized  as  a  bipartisan  issue  during  the  Nixon  administration.
Americans  have  discovered  that  planning  is  not  synonymous  with
socialism.  To  the  consternation  of  Socialists,  some  citizens  now
believe  it  is  the  only  way  to  defeat  socialism.  Japan  and  France,
steadfastly  capitalist  societies,  have  been  planning  since  the  1950s.
They  pioneer  in  "indicative  planning"  which  binds  the  government
to  certain  goals  and  procedures  but  which  is  only  advisory  and
offers  encouragement  where  the  private  sector  is  concerned.  With
the  discovery  of  indicative  planning  suited  to  capitalism,  where
command  planning  on  the  Eastern  Europe  model  was  not,  the
planning  movement  in  America  finds  its  common  ground  with
moderate  political  opinion.
"And  so  it  is  planning,"  I  said  to John  Ehrlichman  one  sunny
day  in  1974,"  that has  been  emerging  in this country  and  that  the
Nixon  administration  has  shaped  to  its  own  conservative  tastes."
He  was  not  surprised,  but  preferred  to  call  it  "better  social  man-
agement".  To  each  his  own  in  terminology.  Planning  is  the
systematic  management  of assets;  it  is  also  comprehensive,  future-
oriented  intervention  disciplined  by  national  goals.  We  are  today
involved  in  what  appears  to  be  a  rapid  evolution  of  our  political
economy  toward  a planning  system.
The  whole  intellectual  climate  is  shifting.  Walter  Rostow,  an
economist  prominently identified  with the  older liberal view that the
government's  job  was  to  produce  growth  through  fiscal  policy  and
that  growth  would  solve  social  problems,  has  recently  shifted
ground.  He  writes  in  a  1975  publication  of the  U.S.  Chamber  of
Commerce:
We  are  and  shall  remain  in  a  world  where  certain  types
of energy  and  agricultural  output,  certain  levels  of purity
in  the  air  and  water,  certain  kinds  of  raw  materials
production  are achieved  and  sustained  in our own  country
and  in  other  regions  of  the  world.  And  it  is  my  central
judgment  that the  approximation  of those  targets  requires
a significant  degree  of national  and  international  planning
which is  not  now  taking  place.
12Senators  Hubert  Humphrey  (D-Minn.)  and  Jacob  Javits  (D-
N.Y.)  introduced  a  national  planning  bill  in  1974.  Many  have  fol-
lowed,  such  as  that  proposed  by  Rep.  Richard  Bolling  (D-Mo.)  in
the  house.  And  the  Humphrey-Hawkins  Full  Employment  bill
which  was  endorsed  by every major Democratic  candidate  for presi-
dent,  and which  very  narrowly  failed  of a  vote  in  both  houses  this
session,  is  a  planning  bill.
These  are  only trends  and  changes  in the  political environment.
Vast  changes  in  the  American  and  world  economy  are  also  altering
the  economy  side  of  political  economy-toward  interdependence,
altered  views  of property rights,  and  the  necessity  for management.
That  we  will  enter  a  more  collectivistic  age  is  inevitable.  Can  we
make  it collectivism  openly  arrived  at,  based  upon the real  and  sus-
tained  consultation  of  affected  individuals?  Can  we  suffuse  our
social  controls  with  respect  for  individual  rights,  a  commitment  to
what  we  call  due  process?  Can  we  extend  public  control  where
inescapably  required  by  the  public  good,  and  still  recognize  the
irreplacable  role of the marketplace  where  individuals  under  certain
conditions  can  and  do  exercise  an  important  degree  of  personal
choice?
These  are  the questions  we  face.  Many are still frightened at  the
idea  of  planning.  They  do  not  see  that  freedom  is  narrowed  by
chaos  and short-sighted  interventions,  that it  may  be  preserved  and
even  enlarged  only  by  social  action  which  is  rational  and  compre-
hensive  and  tries  to  see  the  whole.  But  those  who  fear  are  not
without  their  fundamental  insight.  Social  engineering  is  terribly
dangerous.  The  arrogance  of  the  managers  often  outruns  their
vision  or judgment.  If there  is to  be  engineering,  it  must be  by  all
of us.  The  design  of accountable  systems  of power  is  this  genera-
tion's  assignment-urgent,  hazardous,  but  unavoidable.  The  presi-
dency  will  and  must  remain  a  powerful  policy-initiating  and
administrative  position.  Yet  we  must  check  that  managerial  power
with  a  congress  adequately  staffed  to  participate  in  modern
management,  with  a  vigilant  press,  with  a  pluralistic,  independent
and  perpetually  skeptical  citizenry.
It  is  not  Watergate  which  makes  the  discussion,  selection  and
implementation  of  reforms  imperative.  It  is  the  impending
strengthening  of the  power  of social  management  vested  in  a  free
people's  elected  government.
Among  all the  radical  futures  which  are  our  only  choices,  the
most  congenial  to  a  freedom-loving  as  well  as  an  affluence-loving
people,  will  be  a  planning  future.  To  the  design  of  that  new
13political  economy one  may now  summon friends  of both  liberty  and
order.  For  it  is  its  design,  not  its  necessity,  which  is  the  great
question  now  facing this transitional  generation  of Americans.
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